Starting in late July this year, the domestic shipping industry experienced widespread turmoil. Typhoon weather, coupled with the peak export season, put immense pressure on core container ports in East and South China, leading to widespread shipping delays, overflowing port yards, and a lack of available slots for loaded containers. The most noticeable change was a doubling of container handling fees at Shanghai Port, with some yards quoting prices as high as 6,000 yuan per container, prompting many foreign trade professionals to exclaim that "containers are more expensive than the goods."
This nationwide port congestion and soaring logistics costs were not solely due to weather or cargo volume; it was a complete chain reaction, progressively escalating and interconnected, ultimately creating an industry-wide predicament.
The first step: Typhoon shutdowns sowed the seeds of future congestion. In late July, Typhoons Bavi and Noul made landfall in succession, causing coastal ports to completely suspend berthing, loading, unloading, and gate operations. At Shanghai Yangshan Port, ships experienced waiting times of up to 12 days, and at Waigaoqiao Port, the waiting time was as long as 8 days. A large number of ships and containers were forced to remain stranded, setting the stage for subsequent congestion.
Step Two: Peak Season Order Surge, Ports Have No Buffer Space. After the weather warmed up in August, port operations gradually recovered, but the backlog of cargo had not yet been cleared. Coinciding with the peak export season in the third quarter, coupled with shipping companies adjusting freight rates, cargo owners rushed to place orders, leading to terminals and yards operating at full capacity for extended periods with absolutely no room for error.
Step Three: Disrupted Shipping Schedules, Compressed Port Window. Earlier typhoons caused widespread ship delays, collectively postponing berthing times. The previously relaxed container return period was drastically compressed, requiring a massive influx of containers to enter the port within a very short time, completely disrupting the shipping rhythm.
Step Four: Port Saturation, Large Overflow of Heavy Containers. The continuous influx of cargo completely saturated port yards. The utilization rate of the Ningbo Meishan Port yard approached 90%, and Shanghai Port exceeded 95% at times. With no internal handling space, a large number of heavy containers had to be diverted to off-port yards for temporary storage.
Step 5: Risk Transfer, Soaring Export Costs. The implementation of the new ETB-7 regulations in South China is essentially a means of diverting pressure from ports: shifting from "serving goods according to shipping schedules" to "selecting goods according to port capacity." If a vessel experiences a second delay, the ETB time changes, and the already secured reservation becomes invalid. All turnover risks, time costs, and additional expenses are ultimately borne by the cargo owners and freight forwarders.
However, according to meteorological information, Typhoon Dolphin (No. 13 of this year) is still developing, and market concerns that the recently eased port operation rhythm has been disrupted again, with the possibility of a second deterioration in shipping schedules and yard pressures.
