If the Middle East has been in a state of high tension for the past few years, then Iran's move is tantamount to pulling the plug.
The memorandum of understanding that the US and Iran had painstakingly maintained was terminated by Iran, escalating the war and rewriting the security calculations of neighboring countries.
Let's look at the most crucial action: On July 18th local time, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi publicly stated that due to the US's serious breach of commitments, Iran had decided to cease fulfilling the memorandum of understanding.
This wasn't just a technical statement from any department; it was a clear message: Iran would no longer "hold back" as previously agreed, and all previous self-restraints were to be withdrawn.
In fact, the groundwork had been laid before this.
Just one day before the official announcement, Rezaei, an advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader, stated that the memorandum of understanding had long been defunct, and if the US continued its attacks, Iran would shift from its past "proportional retaliation and deterrence" to a full-scale offensive, aiming to directly "destroy" the opponent's combat capabilities.
This statement clearly outlined the nature of the next phase of the conflict.
So why did Iran choose this juncture to overturn the agreement? The direct reason given is that the US military "crossed a red line."
According to reports, just before Iran terminated the memorandum, the US military attacked a bridge in Iran, causing the Hamir Port Bridge to collapse and killing three villagers crossing the border.
This, coupled with the US-Israeli coalition's missile attack on an Iranian primary school at the beginning of the conflict, which sparked strong public resentment, means that for Iran, such attacks on civilian infrastructure are not isolated incidents, but rather a continuous crossing of the line.
From Iran's perspective, these events combined change the nature of the situation: first, they touched a raw nerve in public sentiment, requiring a strong response in the domestic media; second, they allow Iran to label its actions as "war crimes" on the international stage, gaining a narrative advantage.
Iran has already submitted a letter of complaint to the United Nations, detailing the US military's destruction of civilian infrastructure and the resulting civilian casualties, attempting to occupy the "moral high ground" in international law and public opinion.
In other words, this move by Iran is a two-pronged approach: domestically, it wants to tell its people that the government is not backing down; internationally, it wants to tell the world that the US military's actions in the Middle East have veered from normal military operations into a gray area that violates the UN Charter. The memorandum became the convenient target for "abandonment."
This sudden shift in policy elicited the strongest reaction from neighboring Middle Eastern countries.
Because if the US-Iran conflict continues to escalate, Iran's retaliation will not only target US forces; US allies, bases, ports, and energy facilities could all be added to the retaliation list.
The closer one is to the US, the greater the risk.
For decades, the US's strategy for the Middle East has been roughly this: you handle oil and geopolitical location, I handle security protection, and incidentally, tie settlement rights, financial systems, and military bases together.
This "security for dependence" model has sustained the US's long-term influence in the Middle East.
But in the past year or two, this model has begun to loosen, and the recent Iranian incident has only accelerated this.
Last September, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, explicitly establishing a new framework for cooperation at the defense level.
Pakistan's position is straightforward: whoever attacks Saudi Arabia is simultaneously offending Pakistan.
This commitment gives Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries a completely new option-security doesn't necessarily have to be obtained solely from the US.
Following this, Kuwait proactively escalated its efforts, engaging in deeper defense cooperation talks with Pakistan, hoping to incorporate Pakistan's ground forces, fighter jets, drones, air defense systems, and other comprehensive capabilities to rebuild its security perimeter.
Although Pakistan, acting as a mediator, did not immediately agree to send combat troops, its intention to cooperate was clear: the Middle East's "defense circle of friends" is being reshuffled.
What does this mean for the United States?
In the past, the US's advantage in the Middle East wasn't just its military presence, but also its image as the "sole security provider."
If you had security needs, you had to go through Washington.
Now, countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, traditionally reliant on US defense, are actively seeking multiple security backers, no longer placing all their bets on the US. The US's influence in the Middle East is naturally declining.
Once security cooperation becomes "diversified supply," the subsequent chain reaction is easy to imagine: energy cooperation will diversify, trade settlements can use more other currencies, infrastructure construction can find new partners, and the old combination of "dollar hegemony + Middle Eastern oil" will lose stability.
Against this backdrop, the escalation of the US-Iran conflict raises the question of who benefits and who loses, a calculation each country is keenly aware of.
As American media commentator Zakaria pointed out in a commentary, the US's proactive escalation of tensions with Iran, in effect, is tantamount to handing China a "gift."
His logic has three main layers:
First, with Middle Eastern countries shedding their sole security dependence on the US, their cooperation is more likely to "look eastward."
In terms of security, they can establish mutual protection mechanisms with countries like Pakistan, which possess certain military strength and geopolitical advantages. Economically, they are more willing to engage in long-term cooperation with China in oil and gas, infrastructure, and trade.
China's long-standing projects and initiatives in the Middle East are more likely to gain attention and support in this environment.
Second, global energy anxiety is driving the transition to new energy sources.
The US-Iran conflict, coupled with instability in the Middle East, has increased market uncertainty regarding traditional oil supplies, making it a realistic choice for countries to accelerate the adjustment of their energy structures and increase the proportion of new energy sources.
From this perspective, China, with its complete new energy industry chain and large-scale manufacturing capabilities, has a greater chance of securing a dominant position in the new round of energy landscape reshaping.
The third layer is the contrasting effect of international image.
In this turmoil, the US military has been accused of repeatedly attacking civilian facilities and causing civilian casualties. The impression it has left on the international community is that while its power remains, its behavior lacks restraint and even disregards international law.
In contrast, China, in similar conflicts, emphasizes political solutions, easing tensions through negotiations, and respecting the UN framework. This stable image and emphasis on rules naturally stand out in comparison.
From a broader perspective, Iran's termination of the memorandum has transcended the scope of "US-Iran bilateral relations" and is more like a stress test of the US's long-term hegemony in the Middle East.
The result of the test is: the US military remains capable of fighting, but its diplomatic space, international credibility, and the trust of its allies are all being eroded simultaneously.
On the US side, options are also limited.
The US can either keep the conflict under control, using sanctions, limited strikes, and propaganda to wear down Iran; or it can escalate the conflict further, forcing Iran to make concessions through stronger military action.
However, with each escalation, the centrifugal force on neighboring countries increases, and the space for cooperation widens for other major powers like China.
Iran, after terminating the memorandum, has clearly stated its next phase of strategy: if the US continues its offensive, it will no longer adhere to the past logic of "stopping short," but will organize its actions with the goal of destroying its opponent's capabilities.
This statement itself is a deterrent, telling the US that the era of US dominance in the Middle East is waning.
The next step in the Middle East may not be a major "decisive battle," but more likely a slow but continuous power shift: security dependence will shift from singular to pluralistic, economic cooperation from one-way to two-way, and discourse power from a single center to multiple nodes.
Iran's recent overturning of the table simply brings this shift process more clearly to the forefront.
Whether the US will back down is difficult to say in a single sentence.
But one thing is certain: every instance of using hard power in the Middle East while ignoring public sentiment and international rules erodes its own long-term advantages.
Those countries that don't rush to take a stand or use force, but instead steadily build supply chains and cooperation networks on the sidelines, are often the ultimate beneficiaries.
